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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
PAUL BURNINGHAM, 
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
CaseNo.960656-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In response to the State's appeal, the defendant raises the issue of whether a trial court may 
grant the remedy of dismissal-with-prejudice for a discovery violation pursuant to Rule 16(g) of 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure irrespective of the provisions of Rule 25 of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which governs the dismissal of criminal cases without trial. In his cross-appeal, the 
defendant raises the issue of whether Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, applied through Rule 
81(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, mandates the awarding of attorney's fees for the refiling of 
criminal charges that were previously voluntarily dismissed by the State. These issues principally 
concern questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 
1991). The cross-appeal also necessarily raises the claim that Judge Dever abused his discretion in 
refusing to award attorney' s fees. Claims of abuse of discretion are reviewed with deference to the 
trial court. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,988 (Utah 1988). 
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RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The State's appeal does not directly implicate any specific statutory or constitutional 
construction, but rather it regards the construction to be given to Rules 16 and 25 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter URCrP). URCrP 16 addresses discovery in criminal cases, and 
URCrP 25 addresses the dismissal of criminal cases without trial. In relevant part, these rules 
provide: 
"If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention 
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [pertaining to 
discovery], the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, 
or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
URCrP 16(g) (emphasis added). 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court 
may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an 
information or indictment dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to 
trial... 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered 
into the minutes. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon grounds that there was unreasonable delay,... 
further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred.. 
URCrP 25 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the defendant's cross-appeal does not directly implicate any statutory or 
constitutional construction, but rather he calls upon the Court to construe Rules 41 and 81 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter URCP) in conjunction with URCrP 16(g). In relevant 
part, these civil procedure rules provide: 
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"Voluntary dismissal, effect thereof 
(1) By plaintiff, by stipulation ... [A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff 
without order of the court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before 
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, or 
(ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the 
action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the 
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in 
any court in the United States or of any state an action based on or including the 
same claim. 
(2) By order of the court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance 
save upon the order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court 
deems proper. ... Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
URCP 41(a) (italics added). 
"Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an 
action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim 
against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs 
for the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the 
proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
URCP 41(d). 
"Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also 
govern in an aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory 
or constitutional requirement. 
URCP 81(e). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Supplementing its argument in its original brief, the State argues in response to the issues 
raised by the defendant: (1) that he misconstrues the Rules of Criminal Procedure when he invites 
the Court to construe URCrP 16(g) to liberally confer upon trial courts the power to dismiss 
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criminal prosecutions with prejudice without first determining that no less harsh remedy may be 
employed; (2) that he misconstrues URCP 81 (e) to mean that the rule governing the dismissal of 
civil actions supersedes the rule governing the dismissal of criminal indictments and informations; 
(3) that if URCP 41 does apply to the facts of this case, then the defendant must concede that the 
trial courts each erred in purporting to dismiss this prosecution with prejudice; and (4) that if 
URCP 41 does apply to the facts of this case, the defendant has failed to make any showing that the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award attorneys fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. URCrP 16(g) may not be Construed in a Vacuum. 
The defendant takes issue with the State for what the defendant characterizes as the State's 
"...attempts to hide behind Rule 25 to justify its erroneous refiling of this action." Defendant's brief 
at page 10. The defendant then goes on to argue that this case was not originally dismissed 
pursuant to URCrP 25, but rather it was dismissed by Judge Palmer pursuant to URCrP 16(g) as the 
remedy for a discovery violation. By his attempt to distance URCrP 25 from the resolution of this 
case, the defendant ignores the plain reading of URCrP 25, which designates it as the only rule of 
criminal procedure that governs the dismissal without trial of criminal indictments or informations. 
Thus, although URCrP 16(g) undisputedly authorizes the trial court to fashion an appropriate 
remedy any time a discovery violation occurs, when that remedy is to be a dismissal-with-
prejudice, such an order of dismissal can only properly be entered pursuant to URCrP 25. See Salt 
Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh 912 P.2d 452,456 (Utah App. 1996) (stating plainly the proposition 
that "A dismissal [of a criminal case] can only be entered pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure"). Accordingly, the defendant has failed to present any meaningful challenge 
to the State's argument that as construed by this Court in Dorman-Ligh, URCrP 25 mandates that a 
dismissal may only be construed as a dismissal- with-prejudice if it is accompanied by specific 
findings justifying that extraordinary remedy by explaining why no lesser remedy would suffice. 
II. The Rule Governing the Dismissal of Civil Actions does not Supersede 
the Rule Governing the Dismissal of Informations and Indictments. 
The defendant's attempt to distance URCrP 25 from the resolution of this case is manifest 
anew in his argument that this Court should view URCP 81(e) as a vehicle to apply URCP 41 as 
governing Judge Palmer's original dismissal of this case. The defendant's argument that this Court 
should view the rule governing the dismissal of civil actions as superseding the rule addressing the 
dismissal of criminal indictments or informations defies logic. In response to this bold assertion, 
which is forwarded by the defendant without any legal analysis, the State notes simply that by its 
plain language, URCP 41 addresses the dismissal of an "action,"1 whereas the plain language of 
URCrP 25 addresses the dismissal of an "indictment or information."2 Since this is undisputedly 
an appeal of the dismissal of an information charging a public offense, URCrP 25 is the exclusive 
rule that purports to govern this issue. 
III. The Rules of Civil Procedure Disfavor Dismissals-With-Prejudice. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant is correct in asserting that URCrP 25 is 
inapplicable to the resolution of this case, and that URCP 41 does govern, then the defendant is 
hard-pressed to explain how Judge Dever could have properly construed Judge Palmer's order of 
URCP 3 explains that a "action" is commenced by the filing of a civil complaint. 
2
 URCrP 4 explains that the prosecution of a public offense is commenced by the filing of an indictment or 
information. 
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dismissal as "with prejudice" when it was issued pursuant to the State's motion to dismiss without 
prejudice. This is so because URCP 41 provides, in relevant part: "Unless otherwise stated in the 
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is withoutprejudice...Unless otherwise specified in 
the order [of dismissal], a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice." URCP 
41 (a)(l)&(2) (emphasis added).3 Therefore, if URCP 41 does govern, then the rule plainly applies 
to mean that Judge Palmer's order of dismissal—grantedupon the State's motion for dismissal 
without prejudice—andnot specifying that it would be "with prejudice"—is without prejudice. 
IV. The Award of Attorney's Fees upon the Recommencement 
of an Action is Discretionary. 
Again, assuming, arguendo, that URCP 41 does apply in this case, the defendant ignores in 
his argument that the award of attorney's fees pursuant to URCP 41 (d) is discretionary, not 
mandatory. Because the language of this rule provides that "...the court may make such order for 
the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper..." it is the 
defendant's burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding fees. See Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,988 (Utah 1988). The defendant, who presented a novel 
demand—the assessment of fees against a prosecutor—withoutshowing any precedent for such an 
award, and without showing why such an award promotes the interest of insuring fundamentally 
3
 Although URCP 41(a)(1) also states that a voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits if the 
same claim had been previously dismissed, this portion of the rule is inapplicable to the facts of this case. 
Also, although URCP 41(b) would provide that an involuntary dismissal, issued upon the defendant's motion for 
failure to prosecute or failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure or an order of the court, would likewise 
operate as an adjudication upon the merits, the dismissal by Judge Palmer was not issued pursuant to the defendant's 
motion, but rather it was issued pursuant to the State's motion to dismiss without prejudice. Thus, although the 
defendant accuses the State of cleverly skirting the imposition of an involuntary dismissal by making a preemptive 
motion to voluntarily dismiss, his opportunity to clarify that Judge Palmer's dismissal should have been with 
prejudice passed when he failed to moved Judge Palmer to amend his order to show "with prejudice." 
6 
fair trials of public offenses, has not met this burden. Because the defendant has not met his burden 
to show why attorney's fees should have been awarded, his claim for attorney's fees must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's brief fails to present any cogent response to the State's argument that Judge 
Palmer's order of dismissal—issued in response to the State's motion to dismiss-without-prejudice— 
must be construed as without prejudice, or to the State's argument that the defendant was never 
entitled to the remedy of dismissal-with-prejudice. Rather, the defendant argues that the rule 
governing the dismissal of criminal informations does not apply in this appeal of the dismissal of a 
criminal information, and he argues that this Court should look instead to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, because in the Rules of Civil Procedure lies an argument for the award of attorney's 
fees. In his zeal to present his attorney's-fees argument, however, he ignores that pursuant to the 
application of those rules, the dismissal in this case was not with-prejudice,and the award of 
attorney's fees was not mandatory. Because the defendant has failed to show an abuse of discretion 
by the denial of fees, his cross-appeal must fail, and because no explanation supports construing the 
order as a dismissal-with-prejudice,the State's appeal should succeed. 
Respectfully submitted this of May, 1997. 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
Salt Lake District Attorney, by 
STEPHEN MERCER, 
Deputy District Attorney 
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